U.S. Department of Commerce

    1970

            One of the first policy issues that arose after NOAA came into existence was that of the future of American whaling. How times have changed!

 I remember reading as a teenager about the future of marine resources, including the coming use of whales as a major source of our food. Our nation had a romantic whaling history – New Bedford vessels, Ahab and Moby Dick. Now we were in forefront of those calling for the elimination of all whaling.  As a member of the International Whaling Commission, we had pushed for national quotas on the “taking” of certain whale species, especially those in danger of extermination.  However, for certain countries whaling was an important economic activity.

            The specific instance was the granting of an extension of a license to the one remaining U.S. whaling company. We received requests for the extension from the Congressional representatives from the state in which the processing plant was located. (I think that it was in Oregon or Washington.) They pointed out that some twelve to fourteen people would lose their jobs if the plant were closed.

            Given our international stance, and recognizing that this would one of the first Commerce/NOAA decisions, with adverse repercussions if it appeared that we favored business over the whales, we recommended that the Secretary permit the whaling company to continue operations only to the end of the year, thus giving the labor force some time to look for other employment.

            Quoting from Maurice Stans (One of the Presidents’ Men):

“When Commerce acquired from Interior the responsibilities for marine resources, I had to deal with a longtime program for the licensing of American ships to harvest whales. This industry, which in the early days of the nation provided fuel, food, and such miscellany as corset stays and baleen, had dwindled through the years to where only one American company remained in the business and they were down to one ship. Many species of whales were endangered and the total population was a tiny fraction of the number that once roamed the seas. The Russians and the Japanese were still harvesting heavily under quotas allowed by the International Whaling Commission. Considering all the circumstances, as an act of conservation and as a moral lead to other countries still killing whales, I announced that no licenses would be issued to an American whaler by the United States government after 1970. That closed this long page of history. (Since then quotas on some other countries to take whales have been significantly reduced.)”

            The International Whaling Commission had no teeth. Abiding by the terms of any international agreement setting individual annual national quotas was purely voluntary. There is no doubt that the quotas were exceeded.  However, the indications are that as a result of international pressure and scientific proof as to the effect of large-scale whaling, there has been a growth in the whale populations that were being decimated. Those of us who go to Point Loma, in San Diego, in January and February each year to watch for the passing southward of the gray whales, certainly hope so.

                        *                   *                   *

U.S. Department of Commerce

 1970

Reorganization of the Federal Government is a complex matter.  Much of the difficulty has to do with Congressional control. Specific committees oversee given agencies and the congressional people on those committees do not want to lose that control. Their public constituencies do not want change.

In order to give the President the ability to reorganize, the process was as follows: The President would sign an Executive Order providing for a given reorganization and Congress would have ninety days in which to disapprove the action. That meant that we had ninety days in which to keep Congress from objecting. I was assisted by Ed Loughlin of my office, who had a good feel for bureaucratic politics.

A special Presidential press conference was held to announce the signing of the Executive Order establishing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). I helped draft the press release and the order, incidentally changing “Oceanographic” to “Oceanic”, and then met with Ron Zeigler, President Nixon’s Press Secretary, who would make the announcement. As he read the draft, he said, “NOAA? Like the Bible’s Noah? That’s no good,” and pulling out a pencil, “ We can come up with a better name.”  I grabbed his arm and said, “No you can’t. This is what the scientific community wants!”  He  stared at me. “Pretty stupid…but..” He shrugged his shoulders and put the pencil down. I’ve always wondered as to the name he would have contrived and the amount of public ridicule that would have produced. In any event, the press conference went very quietly. The reporters made some notes and asked no questions.

However, among those affected organizations there was a great deal of unhappiness with the President’s decision to locate NOAA within the Department of Commerce. The typical reaction from the scientific and environmental community was that it was a case of putting the fox in the hen house. As I went about the business of seeking advice on putting the pieces together, I received much more criticism than help. One environmental group claimed that the weather reporting people within DOC often preferred the word “mist” to “smog”. The conservationists and the sportsfishing industry saw commercial fisheries as a threat. The consumer groups were sure that fishery products would not receive close scrutiny. (In fact, as Ed Loughlin put it to me: “The purpose of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries is to sell fish.”)The scientists demanded an immediate increase in the budget to meet the research goals recommended by the Stratton Commission.

Not only was there unhappiness abroad, there was a lot of discontent within the federal government. As examples:

(1)   Clearly the personnel of those elements of the Department of Interior that were going to be transferred to Commerce, such as the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries (BCF), were most unhappy and worried. In one case, a lab on the West Coast that specialized in studying the effects of pollutants, such as DDT, on marine life was dismantled. I visited the lab before the order came through and was impressed with the work, but there was nothing I could do to stop its “destruction”. We ended up with some of the personnel, but not the equipment.

(2)   The Sea Grant program of the National Science Foundation was one of in-coming agencies. The program provided 50% funding for marine research in colleges and universities. As soon as the Presidential order creating NOAA was issued, the head of NSF began an new 100% funding competitive program. All that I could do was to entice a key NSF scientist to join the NOAA top team.

(3)   The Stratton Commission Report recommended that the Coast Guard be brought into NOAA. I have a separate story on this aspect. Suffice to say here that the Coast Guard was unresponsive to my request for any advance meeting and the Department of Transportation was not cooperative.

(4)   The Fish and Wildlife Service of the Interior Department was concerned about jurisdiction over various species. They listed fourteen separate issues, each difficult to resolve. I promised that we would place this matter at the top of the NOAA agenda as soon as it came into existence.

(5)   Congress itself was very bothered, fearful that the entire NOAA purpose would be lost. We responded by proposing the creation of an independent National Advisory Commission on the Oceans and Atmosphere (NACOA) that would report annually to Congress on NOAA’s activities. This helped to quiet the disquiet, although the issue of who would make the NACOA appointments had to be negotiated. And, of course, certain U.S. senators and representatives did not want to lose their control over specific agencies and programs. We did the best we could in these negotiations.

I had the Stratton Commission Report with its organizational recommendations. However, by this time in my life, I knew that there was more to the matter than mere structural logic. I had to get some understanding of the oceanographic and atmospheric community. Somehow I was told that the best person to provide this type of insight was a Dr. John Isaacs, of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, San Diego. I asked that arrangements be made to have Dr. Isaacs meet with me in Washington.

Only a day or so later, a big man, dressed in heavy outdoors wear and big boots, strode into my office. His face was burned from the sun, his hair was a mop of white and his heavy white beard was unkempt. It was Dr. John Isaacs.  He had been doing some individual research in a isolated location on the Mexican coast. From what I gathered, he had been just plucked up and brought to Washington.  This was not what I had in mind.

His voice was quite strong as he looked down at me and said: “I’m John Isaacs. You wanted to see me?”

This was embarrassing. I had interrupted a scientist in the midst of his work for a non-emergency. However, he was very nice. After I explained my situation, we walked our way through the Stratton Commission Report. John Isaacs explained relationships, identified key individuals and gave me his best advice. For example, the Stratton Commission recommended that there be some federal direction of the research being conducted at a number of colleges and universities. Isaacs persuaded me that “hands off” would be the best course of action. As a result I took no steps toward increased federal direction of the atmospheric research being conducted at Boulder, Colorado or the marine research at such places as the University of Miami or by the Scripps Institution within the University of California, San Diego.

Dr, John D. Isaacs  was a patient man as, in his deep, husky, quiet  voice he explained a new world to me. Fortunately for me, he not only had no special personal or political agenda but he also had no fear.  He spoke plainly. As in other disciplines, there were many rivalries in the fields of marine and atmospheric research. Without taking sides, John Isaacs provided wonderful background information about individuals and organizations. Although we only spent a few hours together, I can still hear his voice.

John Isaacs was the Director of Marine Engineering at the Scripps Institution. He later became famous when he suggested that San Diego’s water supply problem could be solved by towing icebergs from Alaska. I am certain that his calculations were correct, but the idea never had a chance.

Following John Isaacs’ advice, I met with certain interest groups and visited a number of facilities around the country. I also spent a half-day with Phil Roedel, Director of the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries and his two top assistants. I tried to assure these professionals that on coming into NOAA they and their programs would not be sacrificed to other Commerce Department  interests, nor would there be wholesale personnel changes.  Dr. Wiliam Aron, Director of Oceanography at the Smithsonian Institution and Dr. Sydney Geller, Senior Marine Scientist with the National Science Foundation, were among the highly regarded professionals who agreed to “come aboard” NOAA.  These were important steps in assuring a good beginning for NOAA.  For me, these were great learning experiences.

Some incidents:

From an outside source, I received word that the Navy would be willing to agree to the transfer to NOAA of an admiral who was its top oceanographer. Feeling that Navy cooperation would be most useful in future NOAA research, I made the arrangements to bring the admiral on board. It seemed to be a wise move. However, there was one odd aspect. I visited the admiral after he moved into the Commerce building. Seated in the anteroom, in front of the admiral’s secretary’s desk, there was a young Filipino man. It seems that the admiral had brought his steward with him.  After the steward had brought in the tea and left, I wisely said nothing about that, then or thereafter. (Until now.)

Several of the more interesting episodes took place while I was visiting the fisheries laboratory at San Diego. As I approached the building, I saw that its name was “National Marine Fisheries Service, US Department of Commerce”. I asked how they were able to get that name up so fast and was told that they had played anagrams with the previous name: “Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, US Department of the Interior”.  Director Alan Longhurst and his deputy, Dr. Isadore Barrett seemed pleased to demonstrate some of their fisheries experiments.

I went on to an interview with Dr. William Nierenberg, Director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography (SIO) which was right down the hill from the U.S. laboratory. (Several years later, I worked closely with Dr. Nierenberg in connection with the National Advisory Commission on the Oceans and Atmosphere (NACOA)). He introduced me to Richard Silberman, then a young “San Diego activist” who spoke about the possibility of doing relatively inexpensive deep-sea research by constructing a column extending down to the seabed, very close to the SIO. Evidently the shoreline drops extremely fast right at that point. Silberman also pushed for the building of an international oceanographic center at an unused location on Harbor Island. (Except as a parking lot, that specific site remains unused thirty years later.) I was never quite sure with regard to the suggested deep sea column, but I was surprised that no local agency, such as the San Diego Port District, ever pushed NOAA concerning an international oceanographic center. It seemed to me to be a natural development, yet I felt that as a San Diego resident, it would be a conflict of interest for me to do anything but mention the idea to the incoming NOAA leadership.

Shortly before the ninety days of Congressional review were over, the Secretary of Commerce was invited to a Congressional hearing on the NOAA reorganization.  While the Secretary would be there to handle general matters, I brought along Dr. Robert White and Dr. John Townsend of the Environmental Sciences Service Administration (ESSA), already in Commerce, to assist in answering specific organizational questions.  This critical hearing went very well.

Suddenly the ninety day period had passed. NOAA was a reality. The Secretary held a special departmental celebration in his office. I understand that he offered a toast in my honor. However I was off on another assignment at the time.

            *                   *                   

U.S. Department of Commerce

 1970

In June, 1970: As we went about the business of organizing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) within the Commerce Department, I became aware that a good number of people I didn’t really know were becoming very friendly. Ed Loughlin of my staff, who was far more worldly than I, explained it to me. Evidently, the normal practice in government is to appoint as head of an agency the person who headed up the organization team.

 For one fleeting moment, the idea of being NOAA Administrator, an Executive Level III- equivalent to an under-secretary- glowed within me…. and died. The concept of an “Administration” was that it would be headed by a technically qualified individual. I had had a three week course in Meteorology in the Air Force, but that really didn’t qualify me. (Although, I was aware of even less qualified appointees in similar positions.) There was one positive aspect to this, for while attention focussed on me, we did not get involved in time-consuming political games.

That being the case, I still had the task of making recommendations to the Secretary for appointments to the three top NOAA positions: Administrator, Deputy Administrator and Assistant Administrator.  Without my solicitation, I received recommendations of highly competent oceanographers, marine biologists and meteorologists. I felt that it was essential that this new agency have not only a compatible top team but also one that could work well within the Commerce Department and be acceptable to Congress. I interviewed a number of candidates- including individuals who were acknowledged leaders in their fields- and finally presented to the Secretary a matrix of possible leadership combinations, with my evaluation of their potential organizational effectiveness.

I recommended Dr, Robert White as Administrator, Howard Pollack as  Deputy Administrator, and Dr. John Townsend as Assistant Administrator.  Bob White was the current Administrator of the Environmental Science Services Administration (ESSA) within the Commerce Department. Howard Pollack had been the Congressman from Alaska. Jack Townsend was Bob White’s Deputy Administrator in ESSA. They would work well together and had the necessary skills and acceptability to get NOAA started. The Secretary accepted my recommendations.

While this was going on, I received word that an issue had come up concerning anadromous fish and that I was wanted in Will Kriegsmann’s office immediately. Kriegsmann was one of the President’s assistants. His office was in the old Executive Office Building, located next to the White House. Since I knew nothing about anadromous fish (they spawn in fresh water and live in salt water- principally salmon), I called Dr. Robert White and asked him to accompany me. The issue undoubtedly had to do with the jurisdiction of the Interior Department over fresh water fisheries, and I felt that Bob, having been in government a number of years and having dealt with the Interior Department, might bring some knowledge that I certainly did not have. As it turned out, he really knew very little about the subject.

On the other hand, it also turned out that the meeting had nothing to do with anadromous fish.

As I said, Robert White was the head of the Environmental Science Services Administration (ESSA). He was a meteorologist with national recognition and a very able administrator. He was also my choice to be NOAA head and I had a strong suspicion that he was also the Secretary’s choice. Just to balance things out, he was a Democrat and the brother of Theodore White, author of The Making of the President, 1968, who was no favorite of President Nixon.

As the two of us walked into his office, I saw Will wince slightly. He introduced us to his guest, Dr. M. who was the Dean of the Texas A&M College of Marine Studies. The conversation went something like this:

WILL K.: Steve, I thought that you ought to meet Dr. M. and that with his background, he might be very helpful to you in getting NOAA off the ground. He has excellent connections on the Hill.

I: That’s fine. Doctor, I’ve seen your name mentioned a number of times in documents and reports and I’d be pleased to have your help.

DR. M.: Well, I don’t know. I chaired the Interior Department’s advisory committee to the Secretary of the Interior and I feel very strongly that the President has made a grave error in placing NOAA in the Commerce Department. (He added some supporting remarks.)

I (Turning to Will): Will, I certainly don’t want to place the good Doctor in a compromising or conflict position. I’d appreciate his help, but if he feels this strongly….

WILL: I guess you’re right. Well, thanks for coming over.

Bob and I walked quietly out of the building. After we were in the Departmental car and off the White House grounds, he said, “Steve, what was that all about?” And I said, “Bob, you’ve just become the NOAA Administrator. Congratulations.” His response: “I’ll never understand you political types and your convoluted ways!”

Two months later, I attended the meeting at the White House at which Secretary Stans recommended to the President that he appoint Dr. Robert White as the head of NOAA. A Presidential aide remarked that Bob was Teddy White’s brother. Nixon turned to Stans: “When do you want it announced?”

Incidentally, in going through the search for NOAA appointees, I learned at least two things about marine scientists, oceanographers and meteorologists: that almost all of them had this belief that in the long-term, things work out* (as though politics and Mother Nature play by the same rules) and that almost all of them were Democrats.

…………………………………………….

* Concerning “things working out”, one scientist said to me, “You know, we all worry too much about the impact of various things on life. Life will survive because Nature abhors a vacuum. Of course, it may not be human life, but it will be life.”  Very consoling.

              *                   *                   *

U.S. Department of Commerce

 1970

            A Congressman, saying that with the formation of NOAA, the Commerce Department would be faced with the problem of porpoises being caught in the tuna nets, suggested that I meet with a scientist who had the solution. At the time, I knew nothing at all about the problem, or even that there was one. Some years later, I did become heavily involved in the subject. However, in 1970, this was completely new to me. Of course, I agreed to meet with the gentleman.

            I am not at all certain that the man was, in fact, a “scientist”. As I recall, he was in the business of training animals for aquatic shows. In any event, he said that tuna fishermen set their large nets around porpoise, since tuna often swam under them. He described what was known as “purse-seining”. To catch an entire school of tuna, the tuna boat would lay down a large, perhaps one-quarter mile, encircling net that was then pulled together on bottom and top, to look like a gigantic purse. The entire net, with all of its contents, would then be pulled on board the tuna boat. As a result, and contrary to the intent of the fishermen, large numbers of porpoise were being killed. He said that the porpoise, while intelligent, had no idea of how to save themselves when the net was being pulled together. He proposed that each tuna boat carry two porpoises, already trained to jump over the net as it was being closed. These trained porpoises would be lowered into the net area and then would, by example, lead the other porpoises to safety.

            What the gentleman wanted was federal financial support for his training and supplying of these specially trained porpoises. I had no idea as to the merits of his proposal. Fortunately for me, I had also no authority over NOAA funding so that I could gracefully and truthfully say that I would certainly see that his proposal received the attention of the as yet unnamed NOAA Administrator. With that, our meeting ended.

            At the appropriate time, I did honor my commitment.  Several days later, a reply came from those who were dealing with the tuna-porpoise matter. First of all, the porpoises the man trained on the East Coast were an entirely different species from those of the Pacific, so that there was no possibility that an association would be made when the tuna nets was being set. While those trained porpoise might jump out of the net, back in and out again, and again, the native porpoise would not get the message. Secondly, when that net was being closed, all Hell was going on among the animals inside. There were sharks, there was pure panic. And in the open ocean, there were often huge waves. Logic could not prevail. Thirdly, while someone would be taking care of the two trained porpoises on the way to the first fishing area, what was the likelihood of their ever returning to the tuna boat after they were set free into the net? Fourthly,….well, the message was abundantly clear.

            In some mysterious way, this message was also conveyed to the Congressman who had called me. I never heard from him again.

*                   *                   *

U.S. Department of Commerce

1970

For various very strong programmatic reasons largely having to do with the protection of natural resources, the Stratton Commission had recommended that NOAA include the Coast Guard., By our standards In 1970, this was a sizable agency, with a annual budget exceeding $300 million. It was then located within the recently created Department of Transportation (DOT).

I called John Volpe, Secretary of Transportation and former Governor of Massachusetts:

I: Governor, as you know, the President has determined that the new National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration- NOAA- should be located in the Department of Commerce. I have been given the job of representing Commerce in this. Now, one of the agencies recommended to be in NOAA is the Coast Guard. I would like to set up a meeting with someone in your office to work with me on this.

VOLPE (very pleasantly): Why, yes. Of course we fully support the President in this and will be glad to cooperate. Just one thing, Steve, you have the Maritime Administration in the Department of Commerce and it really should be over here.

 [Background: 

(1)   When the Department of Transportation (DOT) was being established in the late 1960's, both labor and management in the maritime industry pressured Congress successfully not to transfer MARAD out of Commerce. They were concerned with the possibility of losing out in the DOT’s development of a national transportation policy.

(2)   Presidential Candidate Richard M. Nixon had promised that, if elected, he would support a major expansion of our merchant marine. In fulfillment of that pledge, MARAD had developed such a program and we were actively developing Administration and Congressional support. In return, DOC had a strong, supportive constituency.

 (3) Most important of all: the Department of Commerce's annual budget request was subject to the review of Congressman Rooney of Brooklyn, New York. Rooney justly had the reputation of being a very sharp, demanding overseer. Preparing for his budget review was a full-scale exercise. (One high-ranking Commerce bureaucrat was especially recognized for his ability to play the Rooney role.) It was essential to the entire department that we not offend Mr. Rooney unnecessarily. One way to do this was to maintain a construction program at the Brooklyn Naval Yards. In fact, there was no other single departmental activity in which the Congressman might have a personal, political interest.]

I: No deal, Governor.

VOLPE: Well, I’m sorry to hear that. Please let me know if there’s a change in position.

I: I certainly will.

Of course, our position didn’t, and couldn’t, change. I wasn’t particularly unhappy, since it seemed to me that there could be all sorts of problems in having a law-enforcement agency- that had real guns- within Commerce. In trying to learn why anyone would want to have the Coast Guard, the only departmental value I came across was that the Coast Guard had an airplane that was readily available to the secretary of whatever department it was in. I don’t think that I even mentioned this perk to Secretary Stans in reporting on Volpe’s offer. Why court danger?             

*                       *                        *

Department group creating the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) and since there was no one yet in charge, I somehow served as acting head or at least as prime fire-fighter. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (recently renamed from “Bureau of Commercial Fisheries”) was one of the agencies within NOAA.

            At this time, the so-called “Cold War” between the U.S. and the USSR was at hot pitch.  An international crisis had arisen as a result of a confrontation between an NFMS vessel and a USSR ship off Newfoundland. The two were docked side-by-side and one of the Soviet sailors had jumped from his ship onto the American boat, asking for sanctuary. He was promptly brought below deck and when the Soviet captain demanded his return, the Americans refused. For at least a full day, there was an immediate threat of an armed battle.  As a result of high level, government-to-government negotiations, the NMFS people were finally ordered to allow Soviet sailors to enter our vessel and to take the defector back to his ship. However, during his brief stay on our ship, the Russian had been interviewed by an interpreter and copies had been made of the contents of his wallet, including family pictures.

The press had been following the story with great excitement. Somehow, the sailor’s name and picture became public information.  Congress and the TV commentators were demanding that we stand up to the Communists.  The man had risked everything in his desire for freedom. When the outcome became public, the press went wild: not only had we rejected the freedom-seeker, we had allowed Soviet military personnel to board our ship and to take the man back by force. There were demands for a Congressional investigation.

            As to emphasize the seriousness of the situation, an order was issued by the White House to the effect that no one in the employ of the Government of the United States was to have any contact with any representative of the USSR. I checked my complete list of acquaintances and came to the conclusion that I had nothing to do in order to comply.

One evening, about two weeks after the initial incident, my home phone rang.

I: Hello

Voice: Calling Dr. Schanes

I: This is Dr. Schanes

Voice: Dr. Schanes, This is ____________ of the National Marine Fisheries Service. We’ve just received a request from the White House for the transcripts of the testimony of two of our men aboard that ship when that Russian defected.  They have interviewed all of our people here in Washington. However, these two have left on assignments. R________ is doing training at the Seattle office and Obolensky is in Moscow, as an interpreter for a trade mission.  Can I release the transcripts?

I: (being too cute) Well, you see, the White House is on our side, so you should release the transcripts as quickly as possible.

Voice: Thank you sir. (Hangs up.)

About two hours later, Chris and I were at a movie theatre,. As I looked at the screen, that telephone voice came down to my brain…”Obolensky is in Moscow”.

Somehow, I knew that Obolensky was a former Russian prince and also that Prince Alexis Obolensky was a noted Backgammon authority. As a “White Russian”, he had no love for the Communists, nor they for him. More importantly, I somehow knew that it was Obolensky who had interviewed the Soviet defector and had taken and made copies of all of his papers. It was as a result of Obolensky’s quick action that all of us knew so much about the defector. A former Russian prince, the only one who could and did communicate with the defector…….in Moscow????   It had the makings of a real situation.

I jumped from my seat, ran up the aisle, found a telephone, somehow located the NMFS telephone number, dialed and reached the person who had called me.

I: This is Dr. Schanes. You will get Obolensky out of Moscow tonight.

Voice: Sir?

I: Tonight!!!

Voice: Yes sir! (Hangs up)

I never heard anything further, but I’ve always had the feeling that I may have saved the Prince’s life, prevented an international incident- or at least have prevented the loss of a Backgammon expert.

*                                   *                                   *

Department group creating the National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) and since there was no one yet in charge, I somehow served as acting head or at least as prime fire-fighter.

My phone rang.

I: This is Steve Schanes.

ADMIRAL X:  SCHANES, THIS IS ADMIRAL X______. @#$$$%*&!!! YOU WILL MOVE ONE OF YOUR SHIPS IMMEDIATELLY, NOW! I’M SENDING CAPTAIN Y_____ OVER TO YOUR OFFICE. YOU CAN EXPECT HIM IN ONE HOUR!

I: (Slowly and very calmly) Admiral, let me tell you what’s going on. You see, the Department of Commerce and the Department of Interior have this competition- we’re both trying to find oil. Not that we’re supposed to, but it certainly would help  our PR and maybe our budget, if we could find oil.  Our weather ships are trying to beat out Interior’s boats- and we’re trying real hard.

Well, the fact is that we can’t find any oil. And if we can’t find the oil, I really don’t think that there’s any chance of our finding anything that you might

be concerned with. But, you know that if one of our ships suddenly changes from its pre-planned route, somebody you don’t like might notice that and ask himself why. So my suggestion is that we don’t do anything about it.

ADMIRAL X: (pause) RIGHT! (click)

                                    *                                   *                                   *

U.S. Department of Commerce

   1969-71

 In 1969-71, I served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce for Policy Development. This is the first of several of my stories about the creation of NOAA.

“My senior staff and I searched constantly for ways to improve the scope and quality of Commerce’s service to the public and the country, thereby to recover some of the department’s prestige lost since its high stature in the days when Herbert Hoover was its secretary. Some of these pursuits brought gains rather easily into our hands, and some left us frustrated in failures. Many produced negligible benefits because of the glacial tempo at which bureaucracy permits change, and all taught us much about the vicissitudes of politics in Washington. A good illustration was the birth of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). created to combine some elements of Interior, the Environmental Science Services Administration of Commerce, and several organizational units from other departments.”  (Maurice  H. Stans, One of the Presidents’ Men) 

In 1968, the Stratton Commission, composed of leading oceanographers, meteorologists, marine biologists, etc., recommended that all of the federal government’s marine and atmospheric research and conservation activities be located in one agency: the “National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration” (NOAA). (In the interest of ease, I later changed “Oceanographic” to “Oceanic”. Since the initials remained the same, no one seemed to notice or care.) These activities were then being carried out by agencies located within the Departments of Interior, Commerce and Transportation as well as the National Science Foundation.

The interagency battle concerning the location of NOAA began late in 1969. There were three leading positions: (1) Establish it as an independent agency, reporting directly to the President; (2) Place it in the Department of Interior, which was supposedly principally concerned with conservation of national resources; (3) Place it in the Department of Commerce, in effect enlarging upon the Environmental Science Services Administration (ESSA) already in Commerce, which included weather observation and ocean mapping services. On behalf of Commerce, we argued that if nothing else, this would cause the least amount of organizational re-arranging and activity disruption. We also pointed out that our department had served as the “breeding ground” for other agencies, such as the Department of Transportation, and that when NOAA was fully up and functioning, we could see the logic of then moving it out.

The argument against placing an environmental agency within the Department of Commerce began with such phrases as: “That’s putting the fox in the hen house.”, intimating that there was a basic conflict between national business and environmental concerns. Recognizing that the whole subject of the environment was a political hot potato and that this Administration could not possibly satisfy the environmentalists in terms of budget commitments, I asked why we were so intent in winning this battle- and wouldn’t we be more focussed on our essential mission if NOAA were placed elsewhere? The answer I received from those far more experienced than I in the governmental agency game was: “Expand or die”.

Of the three competing positions, the first, and perhaps most logical proposition, was negated by the fact that the Environmental Protection Administration (EPA) was due to become an independent agency and Congress could only handle a limited amount of such complete jurisdictional change. By the Spring of 1970, it was clear that the Interior Department was heavily favored by the White House staff, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the specially appointed Ash Commission which was considering the entire subject of effective governmental reorganization. We had given the matter our best shot, but the votes were against us.

Rescue came from the last conceivable source, the Secretary of Interior, himself. In the Spring of 1970, the issue of Vietnam was major. Protest demonstrations and group visitations became an on-going activity. (At some point in time, there were something like 1500 troops stationed in the Department of Commerce building.) For strongly felt reasons, Secretary of Interior Walter Hickel sent a letter to President Nixon, urging him to “listen to the youth”. Somehow the letter became public and was published locally and around the country. The next thing I knew, Secretary of Commerce Stans called me into his office to say that Presidential Assistant John Erlichman had just called, advising that the President had decided that NOAA would be in the Commerce Department- and that I should get over to White House immediately to initiate the necessary steps.

Possibly I have simplified the reason for the President’s decision.  Stans gives it more depth:

“I believe he felt, rightly or wrongly, that Commerce was better managed at the time than Interior. “ (One of the Presidents’ Men)

 Hiding my reservations concerning the headaches we would be inheriting, I congratulated the Secretary on his great victory. I grabbed a copy of the Stratton Commission Report and read the highlights on my way. I had never considered the possibility of our winning seriously enough to have really looked at the document. Fortunately the White House people with whom I was meeting had not read it either and the meeting had to do the legal requirements involved in governmental reorganization by presidential Executive Order.

In the days that followed, while I represented the Department of Commerce, Dwight Ink, Associate Director of OMB, was in placed in charge of the inter-agency task force. My impression at our meetings was that the President’s decision had come as an unhappy surprise and I felt a prevailing underlying anti-Commerce sentiment.

There seemed to be the feeling on OMB’s part that the Secretary of Commerce would certainly recognize NOAA’s national importance by transferring to it funds already allocated to, and needed by, other departmental agencies. Since there was very little likelihood of this, I decided to make a special advance effort toward making NOAA effective after it came into our Department. In an early private meeting with Dwight Ink, I said, “Dwight, on behalf of the Secretary, I must tell you that we are not interested in acquiring NOAA unless you can assure us that the necessary funds will be provided to carry out the recommendations of the Stratton Commission concerning research and services. We want to do the job right. Otherwise this entire exercise becomes one big public relations thing, and we’re just not interested.”

Dwight gave me the appropriate assurances.

A year later, our request for NOAA’s budget was cut so severely that very little of the Stratton Commission’s recommendations could even be initiated.  Of course.

                        *                                   *                                   *

After over 25 years, we still read new accounts of discoveries of supposed Nixon chicanery as more White House “Watergate” tapes are reviewed. The ultimate picture is that of a man who evidently spent his entire time in the Presidency in either planning or doing evil deeds. Still there is always some notation that Nixon made great strides for this country in the field of foreign relations. Very little, if any, mention is made of the fact that in the 1969-1974 years of Nixon’s Presidency more socially valuable domestic legislation was either enacted or readied for enactment than in the entire following thirty-two years.

Obviously, there was much more to Nixon’s leadership than that of a single-purpose vengeful man. The period was notable for the high degree of cooperation on major domestic issues between the Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress and the Republican President. Essentially, the concept was that the Federal role was (1) the determination of national goals and (2) providing incentives and assistance to the private sector and the states and local governments in moving toward these objectives. Among the highlights that come to my mind initially are: creating the Environmental Protection Administration and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; enacting the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Coastal Zone Management Act, the Fisheries Management Act, a new Merchant Marine Construction Act, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act; adopting the Family Assistance Plan, the Earned Income Tax Credit and General Revenue Sharing; and vastly expanding assistance to minority businesses. Legislative proposals for a national health insurance plan, a nation-wide model cities program and a national land use management program were well underway. These latter initiatives died with Watergate and the public is the loser.

From 1969 to 1971, I served as Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce for Policy Development. My direct contact with President Nixon was very limited. However, the following examples present a policy-driven, decisive man, totally different from the present popular caricature.

1. One of my tasks was to combine a number of different Federal programs that dealt with oceanic and atmospheric measurements into a single agency to be located in the Commerce Department. In the process, I interviewed candidates and recommended Dr. Robert W. White to head the new National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Dr. White was a noted meteorologist and then head of the Environmental Sciences Administration. He was also a Democrat and the brother of Theodore White, who had angered Nixon in his account of the 1968 Presidential campaign, The Making of the President. Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans accepted my recommendation.

   I was with Secretary Stans when he advised the President of his intention to name Bob White as head of NOAA. Presidential Assistant John Erlichman immediately pointed out the negatives, emphasizing both the political and personal (“He’s Teddy White’s brother!”) aspects. Nixon looked at Stans and said: “Is he the best one for the job?” Stans said, “Yes”. And Nixon said, “Then that’s it,” ending the discussion

2. Separately (In Nixon and the National Population Study), I describe how quickly the President grasped the implications of certain statistics and his immediate sound policy decision.

3. Several times, I attended the President’s Tuesday meetings with the Republican Congressional Leadership when the Department of Commerce had specific legislative concerns. The Democrats, controlling both the House of Representatives and the Senate, held the legislative initiative. The purpose of the Tuesday meetings was to coordinate the response of the Republican minority and the White House.

   As the House Minority Leader, Representative Gerald Ford was expected to advise the President. However, at the sessions I attended, Ford seemed unprepared. During these meetings, the President analyzed each legislative issue and determined the appropriate coordinated reaction. His analysis was always crisp and his decisions clear and precise. He appeared to have a complete grasp of both the policy and political consequences. His voice was always at a low key. He was relaxed and often humorous.

4. I also attended several Cabinet meetings and again found the President to be fully relaxed and completely in control. He explained his general policies and listened carefully to the comments and reports of the Cabinet members. It seemed to clear to me that, as a group, the Cabinet members did not serve as policy advisors to the President. However, he permitted the individual department heads to develop initiatives, without committing himself to approval. Certainly with respect to domestic matters, I felt that there was no restraint in possible agency creativity.

5. Fairly early in his administration, Nixon walked in on a work session I was attending. He had a satisfied smile. Speaking to no one in the room individually, but to everyone everywhere, he exclaimed, “Well, I’ve just figured out how to get something done around here! I found the captain who is in charge of those old miserable Navy buildings on the mall and I said to him, ‘Captain if those navy buildings aren’t gone by Christmas, you’ll be a lieutenant!’”

   (The three or four ugly wooden “Navy buildings” had been erected either during or right after World War I. They were dark shacks, standing on stilts. Among the items there was a photographic exhibit of terrible human deformities. These buildings were a blight on the Washington Mall. They had survived many previous administrations, but they were gone before Christmas, 1969.)

It was clear that a different persona appeared when Nixon “went public”. At press conferences he appeared to be ready to do battle. Possibly this was a result of his early training for debates. Watching him on television, I could almost hear his early Speech teachers saying, “Now Richard, you must speak firmly….” Quite possibly the reasons were far deeper.

And quite possibly these deep reasons controlled Nixon at critical times. Certainly this was too bad for him. It was very bad for the country and it hurt those of us in his administration. This pain continues.

©2001 Steven E. Schanes

Background: As an aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion in China which was put down in 1900 by a combination of Western nations, the United States had set up a program of scholarships to enable Chinese graduate students to study here. The selection of the scholars was left to the Chinese Government. Many of those chosen were government officials or their political friends.

1948-49 was a critical period for China. In that year, the Chinese Communists took over the government of the mainland. There was a wholesale purge of the officials of the old regime, including all leaders of local governments. For those Chinese who were here on those scholarships, returning to China could mean imprisonment or death. However, to stay in the United States under the scholarship program, a student had to maintain grades of B or better in every subject.

In the Spring semester, 1949, I had such a student in my American Government class. Let’s call him “Mr. Chou.” Please keep in mind that this course was Political Science 1, an entry level subject and that Mr. Chou was a graduate student, who had been in the United States for at least eight months before the following incident took place.

Mr. Chou had flunked every one of my tests. He was a very pleasant man, always smiling, always polite. But he had flunked, and flunked badly. I gave him a final mark of F. He came to see me and asked me to change his mark to a B for that if I did not do that he would have to go back to China and an uncertain fate. I told him that I could not in good conscience do that. Then it occurred to me that perhaps I wasn’t his only problem and I asked about his other marks. He had taken four other classes and in each one, his final grade was an F. I pointed this out to Mr. Chou, showing him that I was not his only problem. He thanked me profusely and left. This gave me a great sense of relief.

About a week later, Mr. Chou came to see me again. With a smile, he produced the revised list of his marks and to my surprise, he now had a B in all four of the other subjects. Somehow to my dismay, he had moved the four other teachers and I was now solely on the spot. He renewed his request, and I said that my decision was based upon his test results. He seized upon the “test” and asked for another test. And so I agreed. About two days later, he took another one of my open-book multiple-choice tests and flunked it totally. Smiling, he asked me for a B final mark, now that he had taken another test. Clearly he had not understood the concept. I explained it to him as we walked out of the classroom.

Now we were standing in the school center hall, with students walking by us on both sides, talking as they went. Mr. Chou was pleading his case. He was somewhat short and he was fat. As he spoke- no, begged- the perspiration rolled down his cheeks. “Another test,” he pleaded.

Finally, wanting to preserve some aspect of academic integrity, I said, “All right, Mr. Chou, one last test. You know that we have a Congress in the United States, how many houses are there in our Congress?” And then, trying to be a bit more helpful, I said, “One or two?”

Mr. Chou did not know. He stood there sweating heavily. His life now depended on guessing one or two. The students were all around us. We could be there all day. The situation was becoming ridiculous. “OK, Mr. Chou,” I said “I’ll give you the B.”

And thus I lost my professional virginity.

© Steven E. Schanes 2000